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Abstract
Over the past 60 years, the value added of the U.S. financial sector has grown from 2.3%
to 7.7% of GDP. I present a model of the equilibrium size of this industry and I study
the factors that might explain its evolution. According to the model, a shift in the joint
distribution of cash flows and investment opportunities across U.S. firms has increased
the demand for financial services. Improvements in the relative efficiency of the finance
industry also play a role. Without these improvements, a much larger fraction of firms
would be financially constrained today.
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of the share of the U.S. GDP accounted for by the Finance
and Insurance industry over the post-war period. This share has grown from 2.3% to 7.7%.
The share of the financial sector in the compensation of all employees has followed a similar
trend. Why is the US devoting nearly 8% of its human capital to the provision of financial
services? Understanding this evolution is the main motivation of this paper. To do so, I
present a simple general equilibrium model of a production economy and I study the factors
that pin down the supply and demand of financial services.
There exists a large literature on economic growth and structural change, and the rise
in the finance industry is in some ways similar to the rise in other skill-intensive services.1
There are, however, at least two reasons to pay close attention to the finance industry. The
first reason is that this industry, unlike the rest of the service sector, would not exist in an
Arrow-Debreu economy. If markets were complete, the health care industry would remain,
but the finance industry would be trivial. How then should we interpret the dramatic
growth of this industry over the past 60 years? Does this imply that the U.S. economy has
drifted away from the Arrow-Debreu benchmark?
The finance industry is special for a second reason. The literature on structural change
has emphasized non-homethetic preferences and the trade-off between home production and
market production. These explanations may not be entirely relevant for financial services.
In addition, it is far from obvious that differences in total factor productivity (TFP) growth
between the manufacturing sector and the finance industry could account for the trend
in Figure 1. The finance industry has benefited greatly from improvements in information
technologies.2 Moreover, a plausible benchmark is that it takes a given number of financiers
to monitor a given number of entrepreneurs. If this is the case, the value added of financial
services depends directly on the productivity of entrepreneurs, and technological progress in
the industrial sector leads to balanced growth with a constant size for the finance industry.
The growth of the finance industry therefore raises particular issues, and requires a
specific model. There are two approaches to modelling financial services. One approach
assumes the presence of transaction costs and studies the organization of the industry. Fi-
nancial institutions (FIs) are to financial products what retailers are to goods and services.
1Stigler (1956), Kuznets (1957), and Baumol (1967). See Buera and Kaboski (2006) for a recent contri-
bution.
2Philippon and Resheff (2007) document a large reduction in the number of bank clerks since 1980.
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However, as Freixas and Rochet (1997) argue, “the progress experienced recently in telecom-
munications and computers implies that FIs would be bound to disappear if another, more
fundamental, form of transaction costs were not present”. A second approach, which I
follow in this paper, focuses instead on information asymmetries and moral hazard.3
I use a standard model of financing constraints, augmented with endogenous monitoring
and career choices. The model economy has overlapping generations of agents and two
sectors: industrial and financial. In the first period of their lives, agents decide in which
sector they wish to work. The industrial sector produces goods that can be consumed or
invested. All agents in the industrial sector engage in production, albeit with different
levels of productivity. Some of them also receive an investment opportunity. Borrowing
is limited by moral hazard, and some valuable investments may not be financed. Agents
in the financial sector have access to a monitoring technology that reduces moral hazard.
They sell their services to agents who would not be able to invest otherwise. In the model,
the cost of financial intermediation is an opportunity cost: An agent cannot be a financier
and an engineer at the same time.
A theory of the equilibrium size of the financial sector can shed light on a number
of relevant issues. First, what determines the equilibrium demand for financial services?
In particular, what is the role of the joint distribution of cash flows and growth options?
Second, on the supply side, what are the consequences of productivity gains in the financial
sector? Do they lead to a larger or a smaller finance industry? How do they affect the level
of credit rationing? When productivity improves, does the financial sector grow until all
credit constraints have disappeared? Third, what are the links between various measures
of financial development? It is common in the empirical literature to measure financial
development using private credit over GDP. Is this a good measure of financial development?
How does it relate to the size of the financial sector measured with value added? Does an
increase in the size of the financial sector signal that more firms are constrained, or fewer?
To the best of my knowledge, no existing model addresses these issues in a simple unified
framework.
This paper is also related to the literature on financial development and economic
growth: Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), King and Levine
3See Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Holmström and Tirole (1997) for instance.
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(1993), and more recently Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2007). My contribution, relative
to these papers, is to study the size of the financial sector, and to propose an explanation
for its evolution over time.
Section 1 presents the model and discusses in more details how it relates to the existing
literature. Section 2 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 studies the determinants
the equilibrium level of financial services provided in the economy. Section 4 presents a
calibration and proposes an interpretation for the growth of U.S. financial sector since the
1950s. Section 5 concludes.
1 The model
1.1 Technology and preferences
Consider an economy with overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods. They
work when they are young and discount the future at rate ρ. The size of each generation
is normalized to 1. An agent i ∈ [0, 1] born at time t consumes Ci1,t when she is young and
Ci2,t+1 when she is old. The agent chooses a career and a consumption path in order to
maximize her expected utility:
U it = Et
"
Ci1,t +
Ci2,t+1
1 + ρ
#
. (1)
The economy has two sectors, industrial and financial. The industrial sector produces a
good that can be consumed or invested. The financial sector produces monitoring services
that are used by entrepreneurs of the industrial sector.
Career Choice
In their first period, agents choose a career. Let nt be the number of agents who choose the
industrial sector. The remaining 1− nt enter the financial sector. I start by describing an
agent’s career within the industrial sector. After she enters the industrial sector, an agent
receives two endowment shocks: θ˜ ∈ {0, θ} is a binary random variable and α ∈ (0,∞)
is continuously distributed across agents. Both shocks are publicly observable. The first
shock measures the investment opportunity of the agent. Investment requires xt units of
consumption good at time t and delivers θ˜xt units of capital at time t + 1. The required
scale xt is common to all the projects started at time t. Each unit of capital produced at
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time t+1 delivers one unit of consumption good per period, and depreciates at rate δ. Let
π be the fraction of agents in the industrial sector who receive an investment opportunity:
π ≡ Pr
³
θ˜ = θ
´
.
The second shock determines the productivity of the agent in the first period of her
life. An agent who receives a shock α produces αxt units of output. The exogenous
scale/productivity parameter xt generates a balanced growth path for the economy, as
explained in section 2. Let α¯ be the unconditional mean of α:
α¯ ≡ E [α] .
The parameter α¯ > 0 measures the average productivity of the industrial sector, relative
to its physical capital requirements. The shocks α and θ˜ are correlated. Let F θ (.) be
the cumulative distribution of α conditional on θ˜ = θ, and let fθ (.) be the corresponding
density function. The distribution of α conditional on θ˜ = 0 plays no role in the analysis
and needs not be specified explicitly.
Production and capital accumulation
The consumption good is produced by agents in the industrial sector, with average produc-
tivity α¯xt, and by capital, with a yield of one unit of consumption good per unit of capital.
Let Kt be the stock of capital at the beginning of period t. The total amount of goods
produced at time t is:
Yt = α¯xtnt +Kt. (2)
Capital accumulates over time according to:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + θxtet,
where et is the number of agents who invest. Since only a fraction π of agents in the
industrial sector have a positive innovation opportunity, et cannot be more than πnt.
Enforcement constraint and monitoring
Entrepreneurs have access to a stealing technology. After investing xt unit at time t, an
entrepreneur can always default at time t + 1 and steal a fraction z of her project, while
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the remaining θxt − zxt is lost. The parameter z ∈ [0, θ) captures the severity of the moral
hazard problem. Moral hazard may prevent the entrepreneur from obtaining the necessary
funds for the initial investment. Monitoring services can be used to alleviate the financing
constraint. If m units of monitoring services are allocated to an entrepreneur, the fraction
she can steal is reduced to z − m. The monitoring services are supplied by the finance
industry, with a productivity of μ units of services per agent employed. The total amount
of monitoring available in the economy at time t is therefore:
μ (1− nt) .
1.2 Discussion of the model and the literature
The model has several special features, which were chosen to make the analysis transparent
and tractable. The first main assumption concerns the role of the financial sector. Levine
(2005) defines five broad functions of the financial sector: (i) to produce information and
allocate capital ex-ante, (ii) to monitor investments and exert corporate governance, (iii)
to facilitate trading and diversification, (iv) to mobilize and pool savings and (v) to ease
the exchange of goods and services. In this paper, I focus on the monitoring of corporate
investment and the allocation of capital. The demand for financial services is entirely due to
moral hazard, and I abstract from transaction costs and trading frictions. For the purposes
of this paper, there is not much difference between (i) and (ii). The task of the financial
sector is to make sure that lenders are repaid. Whether this is achieved by the ex-ante
selection of good projects, or by the ex-post enforcement of contracts and good governance,
does not really matter for the analysis in this paper.
One might question the extent to which the services of the financial sector reflect project
selection, monitoring, enforcement or governance. This seems like a reasonable description
of the activities of investment banks, venture capitalists and private equity funds, and
the part of commercial banking that is not related to consumer lending and residential
mortgages. On the other hand, the model probably does not capture well the activities of
passive mutual funds. In terms of value added, however, these mutual funds represent only
a small fraction of the financial sector. If it were only for these funds, the approximation of
an Arrow-Debreu economy would be quite accurate. An open question is how to model the
role of hedge funds. There is evidence that hedge funds intervene directly in the governance
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of companies (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2007)). They can also improve the
allocation of capital by arbitraging mispricing across stocks.
Modeling financial intermediaries as monitors has a long tradition in economics and
finance, and much work has been done on the issue of who monitors the monitors (Diamond
(1984), Holmström and Tirole (1997)). I abstract from this issue by not introducing any
asymmetric information or moral hazard between savers and financial intermediaries. This
implies that firm boundaries within the financial sector are irrelevant. All that matters is
the productivity of the sector, measured by the parameter μ.
Regarding preferences, the main assumption is that agents are risk neutral. As explained
in the introduction, this paper looks at the role of the financial sector in providing services
to the corporate sector. The paper does not take into account the services provided to
households, in terms of liquidity and personal insurance. Risk neutrality also implies that
the real rate of interest is constant as long as consumption is interior for at least some
agents.
On the production side of the model, there are two important assumptions. First, in
equation (2), k and n are perfect substitutes. This assumption is made for convenience:
It implies a fixed relative price, and it simplifies the analysis by reducing the dimension of
the system.4 Second, growth is driven by the exogenous process xt: This is not a model
of endogenous growth. As a consequence, financial development has only a level effect on
output per capita, and not a growth effect. I chose this framework because my goal is
to provide a benchmark analysis of the determinants of supply and demand for financial
services. The model could easily be extended to allow for endogenous growth along the
lines of Romer (1986) or Lucas (1988).
Finally, the model assumes a closed economy. This means that the entire demand for
financial services comes from domestic firms. I return to this issue in interpreting the results
of the calibration in section 4.
4One should be careful in interpreting n as labor and k as capital, however. In the model, α is the
current income of agents in the industrial sector, but agents are not necessarily workers. They can also be
interpreted as firms. Reciprocally, the income of entrepreneurs comes from their contribution to the future
stock of k, but in the data, part of this income could be registered as labor income.
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2 Equilibrium
Market clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that consumption plus investment equals total
production. Let C1,t be the total consumption of the young agents, and let C2,t be the total
consumption of the old agents. The market clearing condition is:
C1,t +C2,t + xet = Kt + α¯xtnt. (3)
In their second period, old agents receive dividends equal to Kt. They also own the stock
of capital that remains after depreciation. Let qt be the ex-dividend price of one unit of
capital. Without bequest motives, the second period consumption of the old generation
equals its total income:
C2,t = Kt + (1− δ) qtKt. (4)
Note that C1,t and C2,t are aggregate quantities and that agents within a generation typically
have different levels of consumption. Combining (3) and (4), we obtain the saving equation:
α¯xtnt − C1,t = (1− δ) qtKt + xet. (5)
The left-hand-side of equation (5) measures the savings of the young generation. The right-
hand-side of the equation measures the investments of the young generation, which consist
of buying the existing machines from the old generation, and financing new projects.
Asset prices
Let rt be the interest rate between period t and t+ 1. The ex-dividend price of one unit of
installed capital satisfies the dynamic equation:
qt =
1 + (1− δ) qt+1
1 + rt
. (6)
The net present value of a project per unit invested is:
vt = θqt − 1. (7)
The total value is vtxt.
Balanced growth
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I focus on the balanced growth path of the economy. Total factor productivity xt grows at
rate γ:
xt+1 = (1 + γ)xt. (8)
Let us use lower-case letters to denote the quantities scaled by productivity: kt ≡ Kt/xt,
ct ≡ Ct/xt, and so on. Capital accumulation, written with scaled variables, becomes:
(1 + γ) kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + θet
The scaled quantities are constant along the balanced growth path of the economy. In
particular, the stock of capital is k = θe/ (γ + δ). The interest rate is constant and the
ex-dividend price of one unit of installed capital is simply: q = 1/ (r + δ). The saving
equation (5) becomes:
c1 = α¯n− g (r) e, (9)
where the function g (r) is defined by:
g (r) ≡ 1 + 1− δ
r + δ
θ
γ + δ
. (10)
In equilibrium, the interest rate and the investment demand must adjust so that c1 is always
positive.
I now describe the steady states of three economies. First, I characterize the equilibrium
of an economy without enforcement constraints. Second, I describe the equilibrium of
an economy with moral hazard and without intermediation. The discussion of these two
benchmarks is brief and is mainly used to provide the foundations for the analysis of the
third economy, where moral hazard and active monitoring are both present.
2.1 No moral hazard
In this section, I consider the case where z = 0. Projects are funded if and only if they
are profitable, that is, if v defined in equation (7) is positive. There are no financiers, and
n = 1. The investment demand (in units of entrepreneurship) is therefore:
ed (r) :
⎧
⎨
⎩
= π if r + δ < θ
∈ [0, π] if r + δ = θ
= 0 if r + δ > θ
⎫
⎬
⎭ (11)
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The saving curve, derived from equation (9) and the constraint that c1 be positive, is:
es (r) :
⎧
⎨
⎩
= 0 if r < ρ
∈ [0, α¯/g (ρ)] if r = ρ
= α¯/g (r) if r > ρ
⎫
⎬
⎭ (12)
The interest rate is pinned down by the market clearing condition: es (r) = ed (r). The
following proposition characterizes the equilibrium without moral hazard, which is also
depicted on Figure 2:
Proposition 1 Without moral hazard, investment is strictly positive if and only if θ > ρ+δ.
All projects are financed when (1 + γ)π ≤ (δ + γ) α¯. Otherwise r = θ − δ, entrepreneurs
are indifferent between investing and not investing, and e < π.
One important feature of this economy is that the equilibrium is independent of the con-
ditional distribution of income F θ (.). Only the unconditional mean α¯ matters. From now
on, I assume that the no-moral hazard economy has a strictly positive investment rate with
an interior solution for consumption. This holds under the following parameter restriction:
Assumption 1: θ > ρ+ δ and α¯ > πg (ρ)
2.2 Moral hazard without monitoring
I now consider the case where z > 0, but I still assume that there is no active financial
sector (one can think of this case as μ = 0). Borrowing is limited by the fact that the
entrepreneur can default. Consider an entrepreneur who has borrowed an amount b in her
first period. Since each unit of capital (before depreciation) yields one unit of dividend each
period, the cum-dividend value per unit is (1 + r) / (r + δ). If the entrepreneur defaults,
she gets zx (1 + r) / (r + δ) in the second period of her life. If she does not default, she
gets (1 + r) θx/ (r + δ)− b (1 + r). The maximum amount of borrowing allowed in the first
period is therefore bmax = (θ − z)x/ (r + δ). An entrepreneur with current income αx can
finance her investment if and only if αx+bmax > x. This defines a threshold αh for financing
without monitoring:
1− αh ≡
θ − z
r + δ
. (13)
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Internal cash must cover the difference between the pledgeable value of the project and the
capital expenditures required to start the project. Agents with an investment option but
whose income is less that αh are financially constrained.
Let ec (r) be the effective investment demand curve under moral hazard. When r+δ > θ,
it collapses to zero, just like in the case of no moral hazard examined in the previous section.
When r + δ ≤ θ, the constrained investment demand is given by:
ec (r) = π
³
1− F θ (αh)
´
. (14)
When r+δ = θ, the effective demand curve is vertical and ec can be anywhere between 0 and
π
¡
1− F θ
¡ z
θ
¢¢
. The saving equation is still given by (12), as in the case of no moral hazard.
The equilibrium is depicted on Figure 3 and characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under assumption 1, with moral hazard and no monitoring, the interest
rate is ρ and the number of project financed is ec (ρ).
Proof. Under assumption 1, equation (9) shows that c1 > 0. Therefore r = ρ. Invest-
ment is pinned down by the constrained demand schedule ec evaluated at r = ρ.
2.3 Active monitoring
I now turn to the case where firms have the option to hire monitoring services in order to
relax their credit constraints. Suppose that an entrepreneur with current income α hires m
units of monitoring. The pledgeable income becomes x (θ − z +m) / (r + δ). The amount
of monitoring required for this entrepreneur to be able to invest is:
m (α) = (r + δ) (αh − α) . (15)
Let φx be the price of one unit of monitoring. For intermediation to be valuable to entre-
preneurs, the price of financial services must be such that v −mφ ≥ 0. It is profitable for
an entrepreneur to hire monitoring services if α is more than αl, defined as the solution to:
m(αl)φ ≡ v. (16)
Let us now turn to the supply of financial services. In their first period, agents choose freely
which sector they would like to work. Therefore, in any equilibrium where at least some
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agents become financial intermediaries, the following indifference condition must hold:
μφ = α¯+ π
³
1− F θ (αh)
´
v + π
Z αh
αl
(v − φm (α)) dF θ (α) . (17)
The left-hand-side of equation (17) is the value of entering the financial sector. The right-
hand-side is the value of entering the non-financial sector, which contains three terms. The
first term is the expected income received when working in the industrial sector. The second
term is the expected value of becoming an entrepreneur who can finance herself directly.
The last term is the expected value of becoming an entrepreneur who hires financial services.
Combining (16) and (17), I obtain:
μ
π
=
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ(αl)
´
m(αl)−
Z αh
αl
m (α) dF θ (α) . (18)
Finally, equilibrium in the monitoring market requires that:
μ (1− n) = πn
Z αh
αl
m (α) dF θ (α) . (19)
The difference with the previous case of moral hazard without monitoring is that the saving
curve in Figure 3 also shifts as people move in and out of the industrial sector. Figure 4
describes the monitoring equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Under assumption 1, the balanced growth path with active monitoring is
characterized by r = ρ, and by αl and n that solve equations (18) and (19). Credit rationing
persists as long as αl > 0, and the size of the financial sector is strictly positive as long as
fθ (αh) > 0.
Proof. Under assumption 1, equation (9) shows that c1 > 0. Therefore r = ρ. The
RHS of equation (18) goes to zero as αl → αh so for any value of μ > 0, it is possible to
find αl < αh that solves equation (18). If the density fθ (αh) > 0 and if fθ is continuous,
then the RHS of (19) is strictly positive and n is strictly less than one. QED.
Even when μ is very small, some agents always choose to become financial intermediaries.
Of course, this means that φ must become arbitrary large. But close to the cutoff αh, the
amount of monitoring required to obtain financing is arbitrary small, and some entrepre-
neurs are always willing to buy this small amount, even at a very high price. Therefore, the
banking sector is active for any positive value of μ.
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3 Comparative statics
I organize the comparative statics in the following way. I first study the parameters specific
to moral hazard and financial intermediation, i.e. the parameters that affect the equilibrium
of the economy with intermediation, but do not appear in the equilibrium of the economy
without moral hazard. I then study the parameters that determine the macroeconomic
investment opportunity set.
Three parameters affect the supply and demand of financial services in the model econ-
omy with moral hazard and intermediation, but would be irrelevant in an economy without
moral hazard. On the supply side, μ measures the productivity of the financial sector. On
the demand side, z measures the degree of moral hazard, while F θ (.) measures the extent
to which firms with growth options also have high current income.
Let us consider the supply side first. How does the size of the financial sector depend on
μ? The following two propositions characterize the effects of μ. Consider first the extreme
cases where the productivity of the financial sector is either very high or very low. Looking
at equation (19), it seems difficult to predict the limiting behavior of the size of the financial
sector, since the quantity of monitoring on the right hand side goes to zero when μ goes to
zero. The behavior of n is therefore unclear. It turns out, however, that one can prove a
general result, that holds for all distribution functions:
Proposition 4 The size of the financial sector goes to zero when its productivity becomes
either very small or very large.
Proof. See appendix.
On the one hand, an increase in μ implies that the same amount of monitoring can be
performed by fewer financiers. On the other hand, the drop in the price of monitoring
services leads to a surge in demand. These two forces determine the effects of changes
in the productivity of monitoring services. When n is close to one, the supply effect is
negligible and the demand effect dominates. Therefore, starting from a value of μ close to
zero, which implies a value of n close to one, as we have shown in the previous proposition,
we see that an increase in μ leads to a decrease in n. For a very large value of μ, the
density fθ(αl) must eventually be close to zero. Therefore, n must increase in response to
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an increase in μ. For intermediate values of μ, the comparative statics obviously depend on
the shape of the density function fθ. The demand effect dominates if the density at αl is
high enough, and an increase in μ then leads to an increase in the size of the financial sector.
Finally, note that the increase in n might occur even though there is still a positive density
at the cutoff αl. Therefore the financial sector might shrink despite the fact that some firms
remain rationed. Of course, one should keep in mind that the supply of monitoring services
rises in any case, since αl always decreases with μ.
Proposition 5 Productivity gains in the financial sector always reduce credit rationing.
Productivity gains lead to a larger financial sector when the productivity of the financial
sector is relatively low. When the productivity of the financial sector is already high, further
productivity gains decrease the size of the sector. In all cases, it is possible for the size of
the financial sector to decrease in response to productivity gains even though some firms
remain rationed.
Proof. See appendix.
Consider now a change in z. The change in z affects the self-financing cutoff αh. This
changes the monitoring function as well as the boundaries of integration. As expected, when
moral hazard worsens, credit rationing increases. The impact on the size of the financial
sector is ambiguous, however. On the one hand, it takes more resources to monitor a given
set of firms. On the other hand, the pool of firms that are actually monitored shrinks.
The second parameter that determines the demand for financial services is the distri-
bution function F θ. Remember that F θ is the distribution of α conditional on θ˜ = θ.
Thus, a change in F θ while keeping the unconditional mean α¯ constant, is like changing the
cross-sectional correlation between investment opportunities and current cash flows, while
keeping aggregate productivity constant. The comparative statics for F θ are unambiguous,
unlike those for z. A decrease in fθ, that is, a shift of F θ to the right must always increase
αl. This is because the shadow value of an extra unit of income, conditional on having an
investment opportunity, is more than one. Therefore, a right shift in F θ, even holding α¯
constant, makes it more attractive to work in the industrial sector. To keep agents indif-
ferent between the two sectors, the price of financial services must increase, and αl must
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increase. This reduces the demand for financial services in two ways. It shrinks the range
of values of α for which monitoring is purchased, and it decreases the number of firms who
need monitoring for a given monitoring region.
Proposition 6 A decrease in the correlation between current income and investment op-
tions decreases αh and increases the size of the financial sector. Worsening of moral hazard
increases credit rationing but has an ambiguous effect on the size of the financial sector.
Proof. See appendix.
I now turn to the parameters that affect the investment opportunity set: π and θ. A
shift in π is like a broadening of the investment set: more firms can invest, but the average
productivity does not change. The increase in π increases the attractiveness of the industrial
sector, therefore the price of financial services must rise to satisfy the indifference condition.
This means that αl must increase. Thus, rationing increases. The impact on n is ambiguous,
since more firms would like to invest, but a smaller fraction can actually do so. A shift in
θ is like a deepening of the investment set: each project becomes more valuable, but the
number of projects stays constant. The impact on n is ambiguous, since more firms are
monitored, but conditional on α, monitoring decreases.
Proposition 7 An increase in θ, or a decrease in π, decreases rationing and has ambiguous
effects on the size of the financial sector
Proof. See appendix.
4 A quantitative investigation
I focus my calibration on the U.S. economy because of the availability of firm level data
over a long period. Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2007), on the other hand, study a
large cross-section of countries. These two approaches are complementary. The analysis of
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2007) suggests that financial development can explain a
significant fraction of the differences in income per capita between countries. I provide an
explanation for the growth of the leading finance industry over time.
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4.1 Empirical evidence and estimation of the parameters
The data used in the estimation are presented in Table 1. They cover the period 1956-2005,
split into five sub-samples. I start by choosing standard values for the discount rate and for
the depreciation rate:
Variable Empirical Value Model Parameter
Length of 1 Period 15 years
Annual real rate 4% ρ = 1.0415 − 1
Annual growth rate 2% g = 1.0215 − 1
Annual depreciation rate 6% δ = 1− 0.9415
Next, I use the fact that the book value of a realized project is x while its market value
is θx/ (ρ+ δ). I obtain θ by assuming a ratio of market value to book value of two.5 It
seems a priori difficult to calibrate the remaining parameters of the model, since they
are not observable. Notice, however, that the equilibrium equations (18) and (19) depend
only on the ratios μ/π and α¯/π. To further reduce the number of degrees of freedom in
the calibration, I consider families of functions fθ (.) that depend on only one parameter. I
perform the calibration using either a uniform distribution or a downward sloping triangular
distribution, both on the interval
£
0, αθ
¤
. The unknowns are therefore: z, μ/π, α¯/π and
αθ. I estimate the benchmark parameters using data from the first decade, 1956-1965. I
now explain how I use four observed quantities to pin down these parameters.
Capital Expenditures
In the model economy, (scaled) aggregate investment expenditures are equal to
¡
1− F θ (αl)
¢
πn,
and the stock of capital along the balanced growth path is:
k =
³
1− F θ (αl)
´ πnθ
δ + γ
.
The gross domestic product is α¯n + k. Therefore the investment share of GDP depends
only on αl and on the ratio α¯/π:
1− F θ (αl)
α¯/π + (1− F θ (αl)) θ/ (δ + γ)
5This is a typical value for the US over the post-war period. Fama and French (2001) report an asset
weighted average of 1.4 over the period 1963-1998. Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) calibrate their model
with an average value of 2.5 over 1968-2003, and they report values above 3 for firms that either issue equity
or are likely to be credit constrained.
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I calibrate this ratio to 11% using private non-residential fixed investment divided by private
value added from the National Income and Product Accounts.
Investment share of low cash firms
Recall that xt is the amount of capital required to start a project, while αxt is the current
income of the agent. Thus, α captures the ratio of income to capital expenditures, for the
firms that actually invest. To make progress here, I need to use some information about
the distribution of firms and investments. In the model, for tractability, I have assumed
a unique fixed scale xt for all the projects, but this is not a realistic assumption. I use a
simple statistic to compare the model and the data: the share of total investment accounted
for by firms whose income is less than one third of their capital expenditures. This statistic
is useful because it does not involve taking a ratio of income over capital expenditures. It
is robust to the discrepancy between the assumptions made in the model and the fact that
firm sizes are very heterogenous in the real world. It also builds in the fact that large firms
are more relevant than small firms. In the model, the investment share of low cash firms is¡
F θ (0.33)− F θ (αl)
¢
/
¡
1− F θ (αl)
¢
.
I use Compustat to estimate this share over time. I use all firms in the industrial
Compustat files with non missing values for income before extraordinary items and capital
expenditures, and I exclude financial firms and firms in real estate. I compute:
st =
X
i
capexit ∗ (incomeit < 0.33 ∗ capexit)X
i
capexit
To avoid issues with the timing of income and investment, in the above formula, capexit and
incomeit are the sum of capital expenditures and income in year t−2, t−1 and t. The share
of investment accounted for by firms with α < 0.33 is shown on Table 1. It is has increased
over time.6 The cutoff must be substantially less than one because the relevant information
is in the left tail of the distribution, but the particular value of 0.33 is arbitrary. To check the
robustness of the calibration, I have performed the same exercise using 0.25 and 0.15 instead
6One might worry about a change in the coverage of Compustat. However, after 1975, the ratio of the
number of employees covered by Compustat to total non-farm payrolls is constant. It is true that these
firms are younger, but this is exactly what one would expect if financial markets improve. See Philippon and
Sannikov (2007).
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of 0.33, and obtained very similar results. The evolution of these three shares is shown on
Figure 5. All three have increased over time. This new stylized fact is an important piece
of information for the calibration. Firms that do not have enough income to cover their
capital expenditures require financial services. Thus, Figure 5 suggests an increase in the
amount of financial services over time. Notice, however, that this could be either because of
shift in the underlying correlation between cash flows and investment options, captured by
the function F θ, or because of a shift in the cutoff αl for a given distribution F θ. In other
words, the stylized fact could reflect either a supply shift, a demand shift, or a mixture of
both. A quantitative model is needed to make sense of the data.
Corporate borrowing
In the model, firms with α < αl cannot invest, and firms with α > 1 can finance their
investment entirely with their current income, as depicted on Figure 4. Total corporate
borrowing in each period is therefore equal to:
πnx
Z 1
αl
(1− α) fθ (α) dε
I compute the ratio of outstanding credit market instruments over GDP from the Flow of
Funds Accounts of the U.S. This ratio is shown in Table 1. It has increased over time.
The relevant variable for the calibration is the amount of new borrowing in each period. I
assume that the average maturity of credit market instruments is 10 years, and I calibrate
the model to a borrowing ratio equal to 1/10 of the outstanding value from Table 1. For
robustness, I have redone the analysis assuming average maturities from 8 to 15 years.
Estimation
Finally, I match 1 − n as the value added share of the financial sector, also from Table 1.
I estimate the baseline parameters using the average values over the first decade, 1956 to
1965. The estimated values, assuming that fθ is uniform, are:
z/θ μ/π α¯/π αθ
0.84 4.43 5.34 1.21
The estimated values, assuming that fθ is downward sloping triangular, are:
z/θ μ/π α¯/π αθ
0.82 3.42 4.90 1.80
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4.2 Quantitative predictions
As explained above, the model is calibrated using values for the period 1956-1965. In this
section, I investigate the quantitative properties of the model, in two ways. First, I compare
the equilibrium for different values of the monitoring productivity parameter μ. Second, I
create predicted values for the period 1966-2005 and I compare the predictions with the
actual values.
Impact of productivity gains
Figure 6 shows the impact of changing the productivity of the financial sector. All the
parameters of the model are the ones calibrated for the period 1956-1965 assuming a uniform
density fθ. The horizontal axis is normalized by the benchmark value for μ, called μ0. The
left panel shows the size of the financial sector, 1 − n. The right panel shows the fraction
of firms that are credit constrained. Consistent with proposition 5, Figure 6 shows that
the size of the financial sector increases with μ when μ is small, and decreases with μ
when μ is large. The right panel shows the fraction of firms that are credit constrained.
The calibrated value is 12.87%. Productivity gains in the financial sector decrease credit
rationing, as explained in proposition 5. While this is virtually undetectable, the size of the
financial sector actually starts to decrease before the fraction of constrained firms reaches
zero. This is qualitatively consistent with 5, but it appears quantitatively irrelevant. To a
good approximation, productivity gains in finance should increase the size of the financial
sector until all credit constraints are alleviated. Further gains are used to reallocate labor to
the industrial sector while keeping enough financiers to make sure all positive NPV projects
are financed.
Out-of-sample predictions
How well does the model predict the evolution of the finance industry from 1966 to 2005? I
construct predicted values while keeping the technological parameters and the moral hazard
parameter z constant. I let the conditional distribution of income, determined by αθt , and
the relative efficiency of the financial sector, μt, change over time. I pin down their values
in the following way. First, I keep the investment share of GDP constant, which appears
consistent with the evidence.7 Second, I match the share of investment by low cash firms
7 In the model, without changing any other technological parameter, this implies that the fraction of
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from Table 1. I do not take into account the transitional dynamics and I assume that the
economy is on its balanced growth path in each decade. Figure 7 shows the actual and
predicted size of the financial sector. Figure 8 shows the actual and predicted ratio of credit
market instruments to GDP. Note that the predictions do not use any direct information
on the size of the finance industry or the corporate bond market beyond 1965. Up to the
1990s, the model seems able to predict most of the changes in the size of the financial
sector. The model falls short in the more recent decade. Since the calibration forces all the
demand for financial services to come from domestic firms, the discrepancy could reflect the
globalization of the finance industry (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002)).
Counter-factual experiments
Suppose there had been no shift in productivity or in the correlation between growth options
and cash flows. What would have happened? Table 2 shows the results of counter-factual
experiments using the calibrated model. Keep in mind that the model is non-linear, so the
effects are not additive: the total change is not the sum of the two partial counter-factual
changes. Most of the increase in the size of the industry seems to come from a shift in the
correlation between investment opportunities and current income. Even without produc-
tivity gains, the model predicts an increase in the size of the industry by 2.91 percentage
points of GDP. Improvement in the financial sector only add another 0.54 percentage points
to the size of the sector relative to GDP. However, without these improvement, the fraction
of rationed firms would have increased substantially, from 12.87% to 19.23%.
5 Conclusion
This paper builds a model of the size of the financial sector. The model sheds light on
the consequences of efficiency gains in the finance industry and on the determinants of
the corporate demand for financial services. The equilibrium size of the financial sector
depends on two main parameters: the productivity of the monitoring technology used by
the financial sector, and the joint distribution of cash flows and investment opportunities
across industrial firms. Because the efficiency of the financial sector affects the realized
correlation between actual investment and actual income, as well as the size of the finance
constrained firms also stays constant.
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industry, a quantitative model is needed in order to recover the structural parameters of the
economy. According to the model, a shift in the distribution of investment opportunities
towards low cash firms has increased the demand for financial services over the past fifty
years. This demand shift accounts for a large part of the increase in the size of the finance
industry. At the same time, improvements in the efficiency of the financial sector have
prevented financial constraints from becoming more prevalent.
The existing literature has provided much evidence on the role of financial frictions
by looking at the investment behavior of individual firms. It is fair to say, however, that
there is not much consensus regarding the quantitative importance of these frictions for
the whole economy, because it is hard to aggregate the various studies into one meaningful
number. This paper offers a different perspective on the matter: If financial frictions were
not important, why would we spend nearly 8% of GDP on financial services?
The analysis presented here is only a first step, however, mainly because it does not
take into account the demand for financial services by households or the globalization of
the finance industry. Incorporating these two forces is a task for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of proposition 4
Consider first the limit when μ→ 0. First, rewrite (17) as
μ
πm(αl)
=
α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ (αl) +
Z αh
αl
µ
1− m (α)
m(αl)
¶
dF θ (α) .
As μ goes to zero, m(αl) also goes to zero and αl → αh. We need to evaluate the limit of
the integral. For all α ∈ [αl, αh], we know that 0 < m (α) < m(αl) and therefore:°°°°Z αh
αl
µ
1− m (α)
m(αl)
¶
dF θ (α)
°°°° ≤ F θ (αh)− F θ(αl).
We can see that the integral goes to zero as μ goes to zero and:
lim
μ→0
μ
πm(αl)
=
α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ (αh) .
Using equation (19), we see that (1− n) /n = π/μ
R αh
αl mdF
θ. Since the monitoring function
m is decreasing in α¯, it follows that°°°°Z αh
αl
m (α) dF θ (α)
°°°° ≤ m(αl)³F θ (αh)− F θ(αl)´ .
Since we have shown that μ/m(αl) has a finite limit, it follows that 1 − n → 0. In the
other limit when μ → ∞, the result is clear from equation (19) since the integral of the
right-hand-side is bounded by
R αh
0
m (α) dF θ (α). QED.
B Comparative statics
Let ∆ [.] denote the total difference of a function or a variable of interest. To prove the
various propositions, I differentiate equation (18):
∆
hμ
π
i
=
³
∆
h α¯
πv
i
−∆
h
F θ
i
(αl)
´
m(αl) +
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ(αl)
´
∆ [ml]−
Z αh
αl
∆
h
mdF θ
i
,
and equation (19):µZ αh
αl
mdF θ +
μ
π
¶
∆ [n]
n
=
1− n
n
∆
hμ
π
i
−
Z αh
αl
∆
h
mdF θ
i
+m(αl)f
θ(αl)∆ [αl] .
These formula hold because the boundary terms with αl cancel out and becausem (αh) = 0.
The monitoring function from equation (15) can be written as:
m (α) = z − θ + (ρ+ δ) (1− α) .
The total difference of this equation is:
∆ [m] = ∆ [z]−∆ [θ]− (ρ+ δ)∆ [α] +∆ [ρ+ δ] (1− α) .
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B.1 Proof of proposition 5
Consider the impact of a change in μ. From equation (18), we see that
∆
hμ
π
i
= − (ρ+ δ)
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ(αl)
´
∆ [αl]
So it is clear that αh decreases with μ. The effect on the size of the finance industry,
however, is ambiguous. From the monitoring market clearing (19), we see thatµZ αh
αl
mdF θ +
μ
π
¶
∆ [n]
n
=
1− n
n
∆
hμ
π
i
+m(αl)f
θ(αl)∆ [αl]
The sign of the RHS clearly depends on the value of n.
B.2 Proof of proposition 6
For a change in z, we get
(ρ+ δ)
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ(αl)
´
∆ [αl] =
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ (αh)
´
∆ [z]
So an increase in z increases αh. The effect on the size of the financial sector is ambiguous:
∆ [n]
n
µZ αh
αl
m (α) dF θ (α) +
μ
π
¶
= m(αl)f
θ(αl)∆ [αl]−
³
F θ (αh)− F θ (αl)
´
∆ [z]
On the one had, it takes more resources to monitor a given set of firms. On the other hand,
the pool of firms that are monitored shrinks. Consider now a shift in the function fθ. We
get
(ρ+ δ)
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ (αl)
´
∆ [αl] = −∆
h
F θ
i
(αl)m(αl)−
Z αh
αl
m (α)∆
h
fθ
i
(α) dε
andµZ αh
αl
m (α) dF θ (α) +
μ
π
¶
∆ [n]
n
= −
Z αh
αl
m (α)∆
h
fθ
i
(α) dε+m(αl)f
θ(αl)∆ [αl]
B.3 Proof of proposition 7
Consider a shift in π
(ρ+ δ)
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ (αl)
´
∆ [αl] = ∆
∙
1
π
¸³
m(αl)
α¯
v
− μ
´
so if π goes up, αl goes up since m(αl)α¯/v < μ. The effect on n is ambiguous:µZ αh
αl
m (α) dF θ (α) +
μ
π
¶
∆ [n]
n
=
1− n
n
∆
hμ
π
i
+m(αl)f
θ(αl)∆ [αl]
Consider a increase in θ. This increases v, and:
(ρ+ δ)
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ (αl)
´
∆ [αl] = m(αl)∆
h α¯
πv
i
−
³ α¯
πv
+ 1− F θ(αh)
´
∆ [θ]
so clearly αl goes down. The effect on n is ambiguous:µZ αh
αl
m (α) dF θ (α) +
μ
π
¶
∆ [n]
n
=
³
F θ (αh)− F θ (αl)
´
∆ [θ] +m(αl)fθ(αl)∆ [αl]
25
Period Finance Share of GDP
Investment Share of 
Firms with 
Income<0.33*Capex
Credit Market 
Instruments over GDP
1955-1965 0.035 0.166 0.373
1966-1975 0.040 0.216 0.473
1976-1985 0.049 0.275 0.524
1986-1995 0.061 0.350 0.604
1996-2005 0.075 0.398 0.624
Table 1: Data
Notes: Finance Share of GDP is value added of the Finance and Insurance industry divided by GDP, both measured in current 
dollars. Investment share of low cash firms is the fraction of all capital expenditure in Compustat accounted for by firms whose 
income is less than a third of their capital expenditures. See also Figure 5. Credit Market Instruments are for the non financial 
corporate sector. Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Compustat, and Flow of Funds. 
Finance Value Added over 
GDP
Fraction of Constrained 
Firms
Starting Value (from model) 0.0350 0.1287
Final Value (from model) 0.0685 0.1287
Demand Shift: predicted value without 
productivity gains in financial sector 0.0641 0.1923
Productivity Gains: predicted value without 
change in income-growth option correlation 0.0377 0.0924
Table 2: Counter- Factuals
Source: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts
Figure 1: The Size of the U.S. Financial Sector
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Figure 5: Investment Shares of Low Cash Firms
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Notes: Sum of capital expenditures by firms whose income is less than 15%, 25% or 33% of their capital expenditures, divided by the sum of 
capital expenditures by all the firms in the sample. Sample: Compustat, industrial firms, excluding finance and real estate.
Figure 6: Efficiency Gains in the Financial Sector
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Notes: Model calibrated to the US economy in 1955-65.
Figure 7: Simulation of Calibrated Model
Notes: The model is calibrated to match the US economy in 1955-65. The simulation assumes that the investment share of GDP is constant. The 
only input in the simulation is the investment share of low cash firm (s33) from Figure 5. No financial variable is used in the simulation beyond 
the first period.
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Figure 8: Simulation of Calibrated Model
Notes: The model is calibrated to match the US economy in 1955-65. The simulation assumes that the investment share of GDP is constant. The 
only input in the simulation is the investment share of low cash firm (s33) from Figure 5. No financial variable is used in the simulation beyond 
the first period.
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